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Book Reviews
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President Ronald Reagan’s executive order no.
12333.
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Marquette University
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Deficits, Debt, and the New Politics of Tax Policy. By Dennis S. Ippolito. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. xviii, 282 pp.
Cloth, $85.00. Paper, $28.99.)
The United States is currently on an unsustainable fiscal path. Because of programmatic
and demographic pressures on entitlement
spending and the present political commitment to maintaining historically low levels of
taxation, long-term deficit and debt levels are
projected to reach unparalleled heights. This
impending fiscal crisis, Dennis S. Ippolito argues in his new book, is rooted in the “partisan disconnect between spending and revenue
policy that has taken hold over the past several
decades and remains firmly in place despite
the unprecedented deficit and debt problems
the nation now faces” (p. xii). The decoupling
of tax and spending policies, Ippolito persuasively contends, is less a result of inexorable
economic or demographic forces than of critical choices made by political elites in the last
thirty years of the twentieth century.
Ippolito begins his narrative with a brief history of federal taxation from the colonial era to
the start of World War II. Although this opening chapter is mainly a synthesis of secondary
sources and historical statistics, it serves as a
useful prologue to Ippolito’s central focus: the
post-1940 development of budgetary policies
and politics. Nearly four-fifths of the book is
devoted to exploring the changing conceptions
of national fiscal policies from the 1940s to the
present. Ippolito’s goal is to contrast what he
refers to as the “stable era” of the Truman and
Eisenhower administrations—when budgets
were regularly balanced and debt levels were
declining—with the destabilization of federal
budget policies that began to emerge in the
wake of the Great Society (p. 40).
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the legalization of wiretapping in 1968; the
1971 break-in at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (fbi)’s residence agency in Media,
Pennsylvania; the Supreme Court’s ruling in
United States v. United States District Court
(1972); and the enactment of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978. These
challenges to the “national security state,” she
concludes, did not fundamentally transform
how federal intelligence operations were conducted but, nonetheless, “had a lasting impact
on the nation’s most powerful institutions and
shaped American political culture well into
the twenty-first century” (p. 2).
Scott’s thoughtful monograph, however,
fails to adequately survey all of the important
policy developments of the era. First, her account of the controversy surrounding the legalization of wiretapping in 1968 misses an
important provision of that initiative: the warrant requirement would not limit a president’s
constitutional powers in the area of foreign
intelligence. In addition, Scott fails to discuss
earlier secret executive directives authorizing
fbi wiretapping and bugging operations policy and the concurrent but unsuccessful presidential efforts between 1941 and 1962 to
convince Congress to legalize “national security” wiretaps. This background is important
for an understanding of both the Supreme
Court’s ruling in United States v. United States
District Court and of Congress’s revisiting of
this matter when enacting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Second, in her discussion of Congress’s post-1975 failure to enact
legislative charters to govern the operations of
the U.S. intelligence agencies, Scott cursorily
describes both the debate over the 1978 bill
S. 2525 (on national intelligence reorganization and reform) and the 2007 S. 1612 (to
amend the penalty provision in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act) and
the domestic security guidelines issued by Attorneys General Edward H. Levi (in 1976)
and William French Smith (in 1983). Finally, she avoids any discussion of President Jimmy Carter’s 1978 executive order no. 12036,
which tightened the standards governing foreign intelligence operations instituted under
President Gerald Ford’s 1976 executive order
no. 11095, and she also does not discuss the
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The Other Welfare: Supplemental Security Income and U.S. Social Policy. By Edward D.
Berkowitz and Larry DeWitt. (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2013. xii, 279 pp. $45.00.)
Thanks to Martha Derthick’s Policymaking for
Social Security (1979), there is a comprehensive legislative history of the old-age pension
provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935.
In The Other Welfare, the historian Edward
D. Berkowitz and the Social Security Administration (ssa) chief historian, Larry DeWitt,
undertake a similar project for Supplemental
Security Income (ssi), the 1972 program that
emerged as a more limited and more conservative alternative to Richard M. Nixon’s failed
guaranteed-income proposal, the Family Assistance Plan. ssi would unite and nationalize
the scattershot relief programs for those blind,
aged, and disabled people who were typically
without the work histories that would have
made them eligible for the disability program
that had been added to the Social Security
program in 1950 (Social Security Disability
Income).
Berkowitz and DeWitt offer an exceptionally fine history of ssi. They explain clearly and
comprehensively how the program came to be;
track the implementation of the new program,
paying special attention to its rather disastrous
launch (offering a timely reminder of the difficulties inherent in implementing any large,
new federal-state program, even when managed by an agency as generally competent as
the ssa); show how the program came more
and more to serve disabled, working-age adults
(confounding expectations that most beneficiaries would be the elderly); describe efforts
in the Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan eras
to reduce the recipient rolls and cut costs; account for the role ssi played in the 1990s welfare reform efforts (with welcome attention
to the sloppy, hysterical reporting that helped
raise opposition to the program and fear of
rampant fraud within it); and conclude with
reflections on the current state and potential
vulnerability of the program. The book instantly becomes the central text about ssi—a
program that has been neglected in the history
of the American welfare state and in academic
analysis of contemporary social policy.
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Beginning in the late 1960s, lawmakers on
both sides of the political aisle began to move
away from the traditional commitment to balanced budgets. Democrats, eager to expand
the Great Society’s domestic spending initiatives amid increased military spending for the
Vietnam War, believed they could provide
both “guns and butter.” Republicans, meanwhile, attempted to restrain the growth of the
American welfare state, even as they continued to support increased defense spending.
By the 1980s they began to exacerbate the
budgetary disconnect by focusing on tax cuts
as the primary engine of economic growth.
Desipite episodic and fleeting moments of
fiscal self-control, particularly during the
1990s, the last fifty years have witnessed a
fundamental transformation in American
fiscal policies. The historical adherence to a
balanced-budget rule “has been modified to
accommodate economic stimulus strategies,
partisan spending priorities, and the electoral
interests of increasingly competitive national
parties” (p. xiii).
Historians interested in a new interpretation of post–World War II American fiscal history may be disappointed with Ippolito’s study. Drawn exclusively from published
sources—mainly government documents—
Deficits, Debt, and the New Politics of Tax Policy simply supplements the existing political
historiography by detailing the give and take
of high politics between presidential administrations and Congress. In this sense, the book
is more a compendium of useful facts, figures,
and seminal events than a sustained historical
argument about change over time. Ippolito
does occasionally return to the main theme
of exploring the causes and consequences
of the political disconnect between tax and
spending policies, but his central focus is on
making a compelling empirical case—and at
times a subtle, normative one—for why the
United States has lost its fiscal discipline and
why it ought to try to regain it.
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